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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EVACUATION OF CITIZENS DURING WAR
The memorandum is not concerned with the power to 
evacuate or otherwise control alien enemies, or to punish any per­
sons actually caught dealing with the enemy. The power of the Ex­
ecutive to deal with alien enemies is now established 
Gilroy. 257 Fed. 110 (S.D, N.Y.); Minotto v . Bradlev. 252 Fed. 600 
(N.D. 111.); Ex -parte Graber. 247 Fed. 882 (N.D. Ala.) ), while spies 
and the like are subject to the espionage laws (U.S. Code,Title 50,
Sec. 31—42,45,45a-d) and probably to some of the Articles of War 
(Title 10, Sec. 1553,1554.) Only the constitutional basis of the 
power of the President or Congress to require the evacuation of in­
dividuals or groups of persons, citizens and alien friends, 'whose 
loyalty is unproved or in doubt, is to be discussed.
The President's Executive Order No. 9066, dated 
February 19, 1942, authorized the Secretary of War, and the various 
military commanders from time to time designated by the Secretary 
of War, to exclude Many or all persons” from military areas speci­
fied by the Secretary or a designated military commander. The Secre­
tary of War and the military commanders were authorized to take what­
ever steps they might deem advisable to enforce compliance with their 
exclusion orders. A fine and imprisonment were provided by Public Law 
503 of the 77th Congress, 2nd Session, approved March 21, 1942, for 
any person entering, remaining in, leaving, or committing any act 
in any military area prescribed by the Secretary of War or a -desig­
nated military commander contrary to the restrictions imposed by
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either of them, Executive Order 9066 and Public Law 503 are the 
sources of the Secretary of War's authority to order evacuation and 
of the penalties for failure to obey orders issued thereunder. The 
Commissioners of the District of Columbia have a somewhat comparable 
power to compel the evacuation of any persons from the District of 
Columbia while the United States is at war. Such an evacuation is 
subject to the control of the Secretary of War, and is authorized 
by Public Law 373, 77th Congress, 1st Session, approved December 26, 
1941.
regulate the activities of citizens, although not expressly granted 
by the Constitution, must be among the so-called "war powers" of 
the Government. The war powers of Congress find their source princi­
pally in it8 power "to declare war". Constitution, Article I, Sec­
tion 7(ll). The President's war powers arise from his constitutional 
designation as "Commander-in—Chief" of the armed forces of the nation. 
Article II, Section 2(l), The Constitution itself contains no speci­
fic limitation on the aggregate of the war powers of the President 
and Congress. The war power has been called, by John Quincy Adams, 
"tremendous; * * * it breaks down every barrier so anxiously erected 
for the protection of liberty, of property, and of life." Annals of
Congress. Volume XII, 24 Cong., 1st Session, May 25, 1836, pages 
4038-9. The Supreme Court has said that the only limit on the war 
power is the "law of nations". Miller v. United States. 78 U. S.268.
The power to compel evacuation or otherwise to
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The extent of the power of a nation to carry on
war may be the measure of its power to preserve itself. Whatever 
limits the Constitution imposes upon Congress and the President in 
their prosecution of a war are limits on their power to defend the 
Constitution itself. In federalist Paper No. 41 appears the state­
ment: MIt is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the im­
pulse of self-preservation.” Therefore, the Constitution could not 
logically impose any restriction on the power of the proper authori­
ties to take whatever steps they may deem necessary for success in 
war. In Stewart v. Kahn. 78 U. S. 493, the Supreme Court stated 
that the measures to be taken in carrying on war or suppressing 
insurrection rest exclusively in the discretion of Congress and 
the President. Under the war power, for example, the property of 
aliens may be confiscated (Miller v. U. S.. supra) and of citizens, 
although they are entitled to Just compensation (Becker Co. v. 
Cummings. 296 U, S. 74). A military commander, acting as the agent 
or deputy of the President, may destroy property belonging to any 
persons if he deems it necessary for the successful prosecution of 
a military campaign, and there is no liability on the Government 
to restore or pay for such destroyed property, U. S. v. Pacific 
Railroad. 120 U. S. 227. In that case, the Supreme Court, in sus­
taining the destruction of bridges by a military commander, stated 
that “The safety of the State in such cases over-rides all considera­
tion of private loss.”
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In Ex parte Milligan. 4 Wall. 2, the Supreme 
Court held that acts Justifiable under the war power are neverthe­
less not proper in places where the war power does not apply. To 
this extent, the protection of the Fifth Amendment limits the war 
power. Louisville Bank v. Radford. 295 U. S. 555, 589. In the 
Milligan case, the military authorities in Indiana during the Civil 
War arrested a citizen of that State and tried him before a mili­
tary commission. He was accused of inciting to insurrection and 
other disloyal practices, but statutory penalties existed for his 
act8. The regular courts, both Federal and State, were operating 
in their normal manner at the time. Milligan was found guilty and 
sentenced by the military commission. In an action for a writ of 
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court held that the military commission 
had no jurisdiction to conduct the trial. The Supreme Court recog­
nized that such a trial would have been proper if actual martial 
law existed, but it found that martial law did not exist in the area 
and that the local courts were able to function. The Court did not 
recognize a need for martial law in Indiana at that time, although 
the authorities were preparing for a possible invasion by the 
Southern forces. The Court made the following observation:
M If this position [that a military com­
mander can rule all citizens and suspend civil 
rights^ is sound to the extent claimed, then 
when war exists, foreign or domestic, and the 
country is sub-divided into military departments
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for mere convenience, the commander of one of 
them can if he chooses, within his limits, on 
the plea of necessity, with approval of the Ex­
ecutive, substitute military force for and to 
the exclusion of the laws, and punish all per­
sons, if he thinks right and proper, without 
fixed or certain rules * * *
Martial law cannot arise from a threat- 
ened invasion. The necessity must he actual and 
present, the invasion real, such as effectually 
closes the courts and deposes the civil adminis­
tration. "
Chief Justice Chase and three of the Associate Justices concurred 
in the granting of the writ of habeas corpus, but it was their opin­
ion that Congress could, under its power to declare war, provide for 
trials of disloyal persons by military commissions. Since Congress 
had not so acted in this case, the trial was held without Jurisdic­
tion,
The Milligan case is one of the chief expositions 
of the war power. Its principal interest in connection with the pre­
sent subject is its statement of the proposition that extraordinary 
powers which exist for the conduct of war may be used only when there 
is a real invasion, and not merely threatened. This portion of the 
opinion, however, dates the decision, since it recognizes only the 
type of war known in 1866. No court today would be likely to re­
quire military authorities to wait until parachutiests were actually 
overhead before steps necessary to control fifth columnists could 
be taken. It was precisely this distinction that Judge Black relied
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upon in deciding that the Milligan case did not control his de­
cision in the Ventura case, decided April 15, 1942, in the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The 
concurring opinion in the Milligan case suggests that the power 
of Congress is "broader than the Executive's in dealing with dis­
loyalty in war time.
The power of military authorities to control 
citi2ens was dramatically recognized in the Ex parte Vallandigham . 
Fed. Cas. No. 16,816 (28 Fed.Caa. 874) (Circuit Court, S.D. Ohio). 
General Burnside, the Commander of the Military Department of the 
Ohio, in 1863 issued General Order No. 38, warning that all persons 
declaring sympathies for the enemy would be arrested and tried or 
"sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends". Vallandig- 
ham was charged with publicly expressing sympathy for the enemy,. 
After trial and conviction by a military commission, he brought an 
action for a writ of habeas corpus, but the court denied it. It was 
found that the military commander of the area had foreseen a danger 
of invasion and that his discretion was not subject to review by a 
civil court. The authority of the military authorities or the Com­
manding General was recognized by the Court because of the existence 
of the war. The Court felt that considerations of personal liberty 
were "not to be put into competition with the preservation of the 
life of the Nation". Thereafter, Vallandigham sought a writ of
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certiorari in the Supreme Court to review the decision of the mili­
tary commission, hut the Court held that it had no jurisdiction.
1 Wall. 243. No appeal was taken from the decision of the Circuit 
Court on the habeas corpus issue. Subsequently, the President 
ordered Vallandigham sent beyond the Union lines, with instructions 
that he be arrested if he returned. This case appears to be an ideal 
precedent for individual exclusion orders, and no case has been found 
indicating that the Vallandigham decision was wrong.
The Ventura case involved an application by a 
citizen of the United States of Japanese ancestry, residing in 
Seattle, for a writ of habeas corpus in order to avoid her evacua­
tion from that State. The District Court, on April 15, 1942, denied 
her application on two grounds: first, that the writ of habeas cor­
pus was improvidently sought; and second, that the Federal Govern­
ment has ample power to order the evacuation of any persons from any 
area when the appropriate authorities deem it necessary.
A Government that has power to require citizens 
to leave their regular occupations and homes and, after joining the 
armed forces of the nation, go to any part of the world at the risk 
of their lives, must have the power to reqiire the same citizens to 
leave their homes and go to another part of the country, either on 
their own or under custody. The power to conscript for the Army 
has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Selective Draft Law Cases.
245 U. 5. 366. The Court referred to the draft as exacting from
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a citizen "the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contri­
buting to the defense of the rights and honor of the Nation". To 
move from a strategic area for the security of the nation may be no 
less a performance of a duty of contributing to its defense.
In Edwards v. California. 314 U. S. 160, the Su­
preme Court recently held that a state may not exclude indigent citi­
zens and paupers from migrating within its borders. The majority 
of the court relied on the constitution prohibition on barriers 
erected by states against interstate commerce. Justice Jackson,in 
a concurring opinion, expressed the opinion that a state may not pre­
vent a' citizen of the United States, merely because of poverty, from 
migrating Hto any part of the land he must defend” in case drafted 
into the Army. Justice Jackson expressly stated that he was not con­
sidering whether Congress could prevent such migration. Since, as 
especially stated by a minority of the Court, the right to migrate 
to any part of the country is an incident of "national citizenship", 
it seems evident that Congress could limit the right to travel any­
where and other rights appertaining to such citizenship.
The war powers of Congress embrace the making of 
decisions on what should be done in order to prosecute a war to a 
successful conclusion. The power to declare war is said to include 
the power to carry it on. The President, and the military commanders 
constituting a part of the executive branch of the Government, deter­
mine how the war is to be conducted and how the decisions of Congress
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are to be executed. For example, Congress has given the Secretary 
of War power to control and prohibit houses of ill fame in the 
vicinity of military camps. The exercise of this power through 
regulations has been sustained. Pappens v. United States. 252 
Fed. 55 (C.C.A. 9th). In a similar manner, Congress has created 
sanctions in Public Law 503 for the violation of any order of the 
Secretary of War or a designated military commander acting under 
a Presidential Executive Order. This law constitutes a Congression­
al approval of the creation of military areas in which all persons, 
including citizens, may be restricted. It is clearly within the 
war power of Congress, just as Executive Order 9066 and the pro­
clamations issued thereunder are within the war power of the Execu­
tive. Furthermore, Congress has heretofore imposed penalties for 
violation of orders or enactments of other authorities; this is 
not improper delegation. Under eeveral Federal laws the only of­
fense has been the doing of an act prohibited by state law, such 
as importing convict-made goods or liquor to be sold in a state 
which prohibited their sale. Kv. Whip & Collar Co. v. I.C.R.Co..
299 U. S. 334; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md.Rv.Co.. 242
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Persons aggrieved by exclusion orders and the like 
have generally resorted to suits for writs of habeas corpus in 
order to determine their rights. This has been true in England 
as well as the United States. Cecil T. Carr. MA Regulated Liberty1 
(1942) 42 Columbia L. Rev. 339. However, a prerequisite to a suc-
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ceasful suit for a writ of habeas corpus is the existence of actual 
restraint of a petitioner. If he is free to move about and appear 
in court himself, an action for habeas corpus is improvident ly 
brought, Wales v. Whitney. 114 U. S. 564; In re Ventura, supra. 
Consequently, a person merely ordered to leave an area designated 
by a military commander, but not actually seised or restrained, 
has no standing to obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a civil 
court. After the order becomes effective, a failure to obey would 
be a violation of Public Law 503, and prosecution could be con­
ducted by the Department of Justice in accordance with the usual 
procedure for breach of a law of the land. There would be no 
question of denial of a Jury trial or any other constitutional 
right. The only inquiry to be made would be whether the military 
commander had reached his decision to order exclusion after Inquiry 
and by following an orderly procedure and whether the defendant had 
violated the order. The defendant probably could also argue the 
unconstitutionality of the exclusion order or, after incarceration, 
in a habeas corpus action. However, the authorities would be on 
more substantial ground under these circumstances because the 
defendant would be accused of violating a law of Congress and an 
act of the Executive, both allegedly within the war powers. The 
decision of the local commanding officer, properly designated, 
to exclude a particular Individual from an area that he deemed
strategic would not be revlevable if based on his finding that
in
the subject^ loyalty was/doubt, and after consideration by the
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commander or hia staff of evidence in hit possession. Presumably 
this evidence could be kept confidential.
Congress may, without transgressing any consti­
tutional protection, provide that the considered decision of an 
executive officer in carrying out his duties shall be final and 
conclusive. United States v. Ju Toy. 198 U. 3. 283. The only 
question subject to contest in a civil court is the jurisdiction 
of the official to act in the particular case, Ng Fung Ho v. White. 
259 U. S. 109. Compare Johnson v. Sayre. 158 U. S. 109, where the 
Court first determined that a petitioner for a writ of habeas cor­
pus was in the Navy and consequently subject to the jurisdiction 
of a court martial, and then held that the holding of the court 
martial on the merits was not subject to review. Even more per­
tinent is the rule that the decision of the President or of a 
state governor that Invasion has started or is imminent is exclusive­
ly theirs and conclusive on all other persons. Martin v. Mott. U. S. 
19. That case recognises that the enemy could be in full possession 
of an area before a court could have reached a decision on the 
propriety of the executive^ order. Justice Holmes, in Mover v. 
Peabody. 212 U. S. 78, which involved the imprisonment by the 
militia without trial of a labor leader during a civil commotion, 
described the rationale of the rule in apt words (p. 85):
"When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon 
a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individ­
uals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the 
moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of execu­
tive process for judicial process."
MHC
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